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Within months of taking 
office in 1967, Governor Ronald 
Reagan overturned a hitherto 
stable tradition in his state by 
proposing that the University of 
California system charge tuition 
from Californian students. This 
fundamental shift in the state 
government’s role in higher 
education accompanied a 10 
percent funding cut, prompting 
protests from students and faculty 
alike. Reagan summarized in a 
sentence the philosophy guiding 
these reforms: The state of 
California has “no business 
subsidizing intellectual curiosity.”1 
He carried this mentality to the 
White House by surrendering the 
federal responsibility to 
“intellectual curiosity.” He insisted 
that states should determine the 
extent to which they would meet 
this need, as the federal 
Department of Education withdrew 
from commitments to higher 
education. In seven years, his 
budget proposals shifted $3.3 
billion in funding for education and 
higher education from federal to 
state responsibility.2  
Both as a governor and as 
a president, Reagan heralded a 
new paradigm in state and federal 
policy priorities toward higher 
education. His proposal for a 
funding scheme in California 
based on grants to individual 
students rather than funding 
commitments to state institutions 
typified his abandonment of the 
post-war Higher Education 
Commission's obligation for full 
provision of accessible higher 
education. At a fundamental level, 
Reagan's framework still 
structures higher education policy 
discussions, and the United States 
continues to suffer from its flaws.3 
To see the tangible results 
of those flaws, one need look no 
further than the inviting water 
parks that college campuses have 
scrambled to construct in recent 
months. These parks, replete with 
lazy rivers and movie theaters, 
represent one more iteration in the 
collegiate arms race for more 
impressive and more inviting 
student amenities.4 As public and 
private colleges have relied more 
and more on individual students' 
tuition revenue since Reagan's 
funding overhaul in 1967, they 
have spent more to attract 
students — and their tuition — by 
branding themselves differently. 
Increasingly, that spending has 
gone to ornate dormitories, 
advertising campaigns and “dive 
in” movie theaters. Reagan 
asserted that California taxpayers 
need not finance “intellectual 
curiosity,” but he said nothing of 
underwater obstacle courses. 
 
An Education Gap in 
National Discourse 
 
When policy makers and 
the general public alike discuss 
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education in the U.S., they do so 
within one of two distinct 
discourses: education or higher 
education. Each of these spheres 
attracts attention from different 
commentators, rouses sentiments 
from different parties and 
seemingly faces different 
challenges. Failing national scores 
in international standardized tests 
and the “achievement gap” 
amongst schools and 
demographics dominate 
discussions of K-12 education.5 
The employment prospects of 
recent graduates and mounting 
student-loan debt feature 
prominently in discussions of 
higher education — that is, when 
the application process to the Ivy 
Leagues has momentarily 
released its grip on popular 
imagination.6  These discussions 
rarely overlap, and problems 
common to both don’t receive a 
holistic treatment. 
The outcomes of the 
student-as-consumer model of 
higher education funding, 
however, uniquely inform 
contemporary debates about the 
expansion of school choice within 
public education. The diminishing 
educational outcomes and 
academic rigor, which have come 
to define the American collegiate 
experience, result from a 
misguided economic policy that 
places students as consumers in 
an “educational marketplace.” The 
rhetoric of school choice, now so 
prevalent in the public education 
sphere, will replicate the same 
undesirable results. An education 
is a commodity unlike any other, 
and when schools enter a 
marketplace, no vendors can offer 
much of value. 
 
Three Decades of “School 
Choice” 
 
In 1980, economists Milton 
and Rose Friedman heralded 
Reagan's election to the 
presidency with the publication of 
Free to Choose, a book that would 
guide Reagan's education policy. 
The Friedmans advocated for a 
voucher system in which public 
education funding would go 
directly to students who could then 
use that funding at independently 
administrated private schools. In 
that way, the student and her 
parents could select an education 
provided in a competitive market. 
The Friedmans applied economic 
theory to explain why the 
outcomes of this “choice” will 
necessarily prove favorable, 
explaining, "If the consumer is free 
to choose, an enterprise can grow 
in size only if it produces an item 
that the consumer prefers either 
because of its quality or its price."7 
Reagan pressed this ideology first 
in his proposals for school 
vouchers, which would allow 
parents to transfer property-tax 
payments from local schools to 
private schools, and then in his 
more moderated advocacy for 
parental choice amongst public 
schools.8 In either case, the 
guiding ethos remained the same: 
Students and parents recognize a 
good education better than 
teachers, superintendents or state 
representatives can. The customer 
is always right. 
Despite its origins in the 
ultra laissez-faire Chicago School 
of Economics, the broad notion of 
“school choice” attracted 
noteworthy supporters among 
Democrats when it had been 
made more palatable after the 
voucher movement lost support. 
School choice became 
The diminishing educational outcomes 
and academic rigor, which have come to 
define the American collegiate experience, 
result from a misguided economic policy 
that places students as consumers in an 
“educational marketplace.” 
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synonymous with charter schools, 
publically-funded schools operated 
by independent administrators with 
more flexibility in curriculum, hiring 
and admission. These schools 
typically receive their revenue from 
tuition payments paid by the public 
schools that would have otherwise 
educated the student. The first of 
these schools opened in 
Milwaukee, and received its 
charter from Minnesota in 1990. 
Throughout the 1990s, more and 
more charter schools opened with 
the blessing and support of Bill 
Clinton’s administration. Clinton 
maintained the rhetoric of 
entrepreneurialism that the school 
choice movement inherited from 
Reagan and the Friedmans: He 
wanted to "reward the best 
schools," "shut down or redesign 
those that fail" and replace them 
with "creative" charter schools.9 
The marketplace that Reagan's 
Department of Education 
envisioned had been realized by 
the Clinton administration, except 
under the “New Democrats’" 
vision, the educational 
commodities would all be financed 
entirely with money that would 
otherwise go to public schools.  
This competitive model for 
school choice has found its best 
salesmen of the past two decades 
among high-profile urban school 
administrators, from New York's 
Michael Bloomberg to D.C.'s 
Michelle Rhee. President Obama 
and Education Secretary Arne 
Duncan embrace the idea, and 
have spurred states to remove 
"artificial caps" on the number of 
schools they charter, lest they lose 
their chance at federal grants from 
the “Race to the Top” program.10 
By 2010, 4,600 charter schools 
were educating 1.4 million 
students.11  
   
Of Used Cars and 
Universities 
 
The heuristics heard in 
many introductory economics 
classes and political rhetoric have 
instilled the belief that open 
competition always leads to 
decreased prices. Unnecessary 
monopolies and frivolous 
government intervention can only 
lead to inefficiencies in the market, 
so one may think. These basic 
principles guided the Friedmans in 
the 1970s and 1980s — and the 
charter advocates today — in their 
challenge to one of the most 
convoluted bureaucratic systems 
in the country: public and higher 
education. The Friedmans 
targeted this "island of socialism in 
a free market sea" as a coherent 
landmass, rather than a fractured 
archipelago. They identified that 
the consequences of higher 
education policy could inform 
public education policy, insofar as 
both represented a system in 
which "the parent and child are the 
consumers, the teacher and 
school administrators the 
producers." 12 They correctly 
identified that higher education 
policy could be mutually 
informative, but they didn’t 
understand why. They considered 
the economic benefits of open 
competition and asked, "Why 
should schooling be different?" 
The answer, which they didn’t 
consider, undermines the entirety 
of their argument. 
That answer lies in an 
economic model that the 
economist George Akerlof outlined 
in his influential paper "The Market 
for 'Lemons,'" published in 1970. 
Akerlof argues that an "asymmetry 
of information" exists in some 
markets, in which the consumers 
can’t evaluate the real value of a 
product they might purchase as 
well as the seller can.13 In such a 
situation, the price of the good will 
artificially increase, since sellers 
will price their products higher, 
knowing that the consumer can’t 
easily estimate a more reasonable 
price. Moreover, a decrease in the 
price could give consumers the 
impression that a product, value of 
which they couldn’t otherwise 
evaluate, must be lower. When the 
average consumer considers the 
value of two used cars, for 
instance, she won’t look under the 
hood, but rather at the sticker 
price. A price that is drastically 
lower than competitors' would, in 
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the consumer's mind, probably 
correlate to a worse product, 
which leads her to prioritize 
higher-priced goods for their 
supposed surety of quality. This, in 
turn, artificially inflates prices. To 
alleviate these asymmetries in the 
market, Akerlof suggests, “in some 
cases, governmental intervention 
may increase the welfare of all 
parties."14 
An asymmetry of 
information exists in the market for 
higher education and the market 
for used cars alike. The sales 
pitches for both products ought to 
make any consumer equally wary. 
Try as one might, parents and 
students struggle to identify a 
“good” education. There are some 
standard measurements, such as 
class sizes, student-to-faculty ratio 
and career services, but those 
yardsticks can’t measure precise 
differences in quality. One might 
look to the overbroad 
measurements of U.S. News and 
World Report, or to campus 
atmosphere during visiting 
students day, or to the sticker 
price on tuition — just like the 
used-car shopper. David L. 
Warren, President of the National 
Association of Independent 
Colleges and Universities, 
identifies the misleading power of 
the up-front tuition price, 
explaining “Schools wanted a high 
tuition on the assumption that 
families would say that if they’re 
charging that high tuition, they 
must be right up there with the 
Ivies,” as quoted by The New York 
Times.15 
Parents and students will 
also most likely look to the 
distinctive campus buildings and 
amenities on their guided tours. 
The rampant construction of lavish 
swimming pools and decadent 
dorm rooms testifies to the 
attractive power of cosmetic 
improvement on campus.16 None 
of this, however, correlates with 
any definition of a “good 
education,” especially as state or 
federal governments would 
consider it.  
The construction of rock 
walls, sports arenas and 
dormitories does, however, 
correlate with the 43.6 percent 
increase in the average cost of 
tuition, in constant dollars, 
between 1982 and 2012.17 Not 
coincidentally, it also corresponds 
with Reagan's ascent to the 
presidency and the consequent 
withdrawal of state support from 
higher education funding. Between 
1980 and 2011, the average share 
of the total funding expenditures 
for higher education that the states 
carried declined by 40.2 percent, 
from about 74.3 percent to 34.1 
percent.18 When states and the 
federal government withdrew 
institutional funding and individual 
students' tuition payments took on 
a greater share of university 
revenue, administrators began 
treating students as customers. 
The price of an ambiguously 
valued good — in this case, a 
college education — increased 
considerably in a market defined 
by the asymmetry of information. 
There’s no reason to believe the 
same consequences won’t result 
from the empowerment of the 
student and parent as consumers 
within the public education system.  
The notion that parents 
won’t select the best possible 
available education for their 
children strikes many as arrogant, 
callous, over-reaching or some 
combination thereof. The 
Louisiana State Superintendent of 
Education, John White, concisely 
expressed this traditional yet 
When states and the federal government 
withdrew institutional funding and 
individual students' tuition payments took 
on a greater share of university revenue, 
administrators began treating students as 
customers. 
5 
unrealistic sentiment: "To me, it’s a 
moral outrage that the government 
would say, ‘We know what’s best 
for your child,’ who are we to tell 
parents we know better?”19 White 
made that claim in support of a 
Louisiana school voucher program 
implemented in 2012. The fact that 
some parents chose to redeem 
those vouchers at schools that 
refused to teach evolution, 
assigned "Bible-Based math 
books" and boasted basketball 
teams and no libraries, belied his 
rhetoric. 
Looking beyond the most 
egregious cases, there remains no 
reason why parents' undeniably 
good intentions and incomparable 
commitment to their children 
translate into knowledge of best 
educational practices. No one can 
claim ultimate knowledge on this 
issue, but professional 
organizations that measure test-
based educational outcomes 
prove more credible than the 
intuitive heuristics that concerned 
parents employ to evaluate one 
school over another. A parent 
would require a considerable 
background in educational 
research and considerable free 
time to discover that, for instance, 
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technology such as Smart Boards 
and iPads produce negligible 
improvements, according to the 
Program for International Student 
Assessment.20 Those parents who 
can narrow the information 
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disproportionately emerge from 
more educated backgrounds, with 
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In short, the only ones who will win 
out in the educational marketplace 
will be those children already 
privileged with parents financially 
secure enough to study that 
marketplace. 
To fill the disconnect 
between parents and best 
pedagogical practices, some 
public charter schools have turned 
to robust advertising and 
marketing schemes. Like their 
collegiate colleagues in the post-
Reagan paradigm, these schools 
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Parents and politicians 
ought to realize that their inability 
to select the best possible school 
for their children doesn’t reflect on 
their intentions, only on the nature 
of education as a consumable 
good. Three decades of dismal 
higher education policy have 
illustrated this fact. Policy makers 
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separates them from their 
colleagues in higher education, 
and heed their warning against the 
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customer is always right, the 
taxpayer is always left with the bill, 
no matter the quality of the 
product.   
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